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CLASS WAR: ONTARIO
TEACHERS AND THE COURTS©
BY HARRY J. GLASBEEK*
In 1997, the government of Ontario met with
unexpected opposition to its changes to the education
system with the introduction of Bill 160, the Education
Quality Improvement Act, culminating in a province-
wide strike by teachers. In reaction, the government
sought to divert the conflict into the courts. Although
the teachers were initially successful in court, the strike
was not, and many of the strikers' objectives were not
met. The author argues that the law of injunctions and
collective bargaining shifted and narrowed the scope of
the conflict, and reduced the political power of the
teachers. The litigation surrounding Bill 160 illustrates
the anti-worker architecture of the law and the
mandate of the courts in depoliticizing capital-labour
disputes. The author concludes that Ontario
teachers-and labour generally-must avoid the courts
if they seek transformative change.
En 1997, le gouvemement de l'Ontario a affrontd une
resistance inattendue face aux changements apport~s
au syst~me d'6ducation suite A l'introduction du projet
de loi 160, la loi sur l'am6lioration de la qualit6 de
l'ducation, ce qui a d6clench6 une gr~ve provinciale
des enseignants. Dans le but de d6router le conflit, le
gouvernement a r6agi en s'adressant aux tribunaux.
Malgr6 le succ~s initial des enseignants i la cour, la
gr~ve fut un 6ehec et de nombreux objectifs des
gr~vistes n'ont pas 6t6 atteints. L'auteur maintient que
l'6tat du droit en mati~re d'injonctions et de
conventions collectives a remani6 et restreint la port6e
du conflit ainsi que r6duit le pouvoir politique des
enseignants. Le litige autour du projet de loi 160
illustre a la fois 'architecture anti-travailleur du droit et
le mandat qu'ont les tribunaux de ddpolitiser de telles
disputes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The nine day Ontario school teachers' province-wide strike
against Bill 160' in late October 1997 was a dramatic event both because
of its scope and the fact that it was an illegal strike. Two features of this
dispute were unique: first, the long-standing dispute had no sooner
reached its climax-the province-wide walkout-than the locale of the
battle was shifted into the courts; and second, the workers had a rare win
in the judicial forum.2 This comment is concerned with what this struggle
teaches us about the impact of the judicialization of political militance,
and takes the teachers' victory as its point of departure. It sets out to
make three main points. First, that the victory was more limited than the
teachers initially believed it to be and, in the end, may have been
something of a pyrrhic victory. Second, this limited victory indirectly
supports the argument that the architecture of the law does not lend
itself to building a movement for political action by workers and their
unions. Third, the dispute over Bill 160 highlights the mandate of the
courts in depoliticizing capital-labour struggles. Given the way in which
Bill 160 was brought to court, and given the nature of the case, it was
very difficult in this instance for the court to abstract the legalized
dispute from the political sphere. Even though this helped the teachers
to win, the law's antagonism to the political use of collective economic
worker power limited the scope of the victory. This result tells workers
that, if they want transformative change, they should be wary of the
judicialization of their struggles.
II. THE CONTEXT FOR THE STRIKE
When the Progressive Conservative government led by Mike
Harris tabled Bill 160, Ontario teachers lobbied for its withdrawal or, at
the very least, for large scale amendments. The negotiations dragged on
I Education Quality Improvement Act, S.O. 1997, c. 31 [hereinafter "Bill 160"].
2 Ontario (A.G.) v. Ontario Teachers' Federation (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 367 (Gen. Div.)
[hereinafter Ontario Teachers' Federation].
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for about two months. Winning public support was key to both sides'
strategies during this political struggle. As part of their tactics, the
teachers made it publicly known that if the government remained
intransigent they would strike, at an unspecified date. The government
said that it would not back down. This brinkmanship created anxieties,
and led to bouts of frenetic negotiations that, in the end, broke down.
From the legal point of view, one of the arresting aspects was the
events of 27 October 1997. The unions finally declared that negotiations
could go no further and that, as of 28 October, they would strike. The
government only five hours later announced that it would be going to
court to have the strikers ordered back to work.3
Three days into the strike, the Harris government lodged an
application with the Supreme Court of Ontario, asking it to issue an
order-an injunction-requiring the teachers to return to work. It would
have come to court earlier but, it seems, the government needed three
days to gather at least some evidence to make its application for an
injunction respectable.
The government came to court because-as in the case of its
protracted struggles with its own employees during the Ontario Public
Sector Employees' Union (opsEu) strike4-it had miscalculated
politically. It had clearly planned its frontal attack on teachers in the
belief that the various teachers' unions, with their very different
memberships and outlooks, would not stick together and would not be
able to keep their members solidly behind them. The government turned
out to be wrong in these and other tactical assumptions. The
government, which had attacked the school boards with- its Fewer School
Boards ActS and was further marginalizing school boards in the
3 See D. Girard, "Ontario Seeks Court Order" The Toronto Star (28 October 1997) Al.
4 When the Harris government came to power, it abrogated all of the major collective
bargaining legislation amendments the predecessor New Democratic Party (NDP) government had
introduced, except one. The NDP had given Ontario's public servants the right to strike, something
that had been denied them during forty-two years of Progressive Conservative government and two
terms of Liberal government. The Harris government left this new right to strike untouched, while it
attacked the job security and terms of employment of its public servants with great vigour. It
provoked a strike, believing that the electorate would favour its repression of "lazy,"
"not-in-the-real-world" public servants. The strike, however, lasted three weeks and opinion polls
showed that, during it, public support was roughly equally divided between the government and the
union: see M. Mittelstaedt & G. Abbate, "Ontario Fears Unrest in Jails" The Globe and Mail (1
March 1996) A6; C. Blizzard, "Solidarity First, Not Safety" The Toronto Sun (1 March 1996); and D.
Rapaport, No Justice-No Peace: The 1996 OPSEU Strike Against the Harris Government in Ontario
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999).
5 S.O. 1997, c. 3. This Act reduced the number of school boards from 129 to 72, and the
number of trustees from 1,900 to 700. It also capped trustees' remuneration at $5,000.
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contentious Bill 160,6 seemed to think that it could count on the support
of school boards, but was clearly mistaken. The school boards did
nothing to help the government. Further, throughout the highly
publicized negotiations that, as noted, were vitally concerned with
winning public support, the government maintained the teachers'
allegations (that the Harris government was anti-education, and that it
intended to take a huge amount of money out of the education portfolio
to fund its tax rebates for the rich) were an unjustified calumny.
However, on 22 October the contents of a contract struck between the
government and a new deputy minister were leaked to the media. This
leaked document suggested that the deputy minister would earn a
performance bonus if the goal of cutting $667 million out of the
education budget was achieved.7 From the government's perspective,
this revelation not only had an unfavourable impact on its bid for the
hearts and minds of the people, it also displayed how poorly conceived
the government's plans had been.
In addition to these tactical blunders, the Harris forces had
counted on being able to paint teachers as well-paid workers with great
holidays and short working days. To this end, it had made much of what
it alleged to be the overly generous preparation time teachers enjoyed
and of how poorly Ontario students were faring when their test results
were compared with those of students in other jurisdictions. But once
they had been found out to be less than trustworthy on the defunding
issue, and when the teachers received a surprising amount of support
from their secondary high school students, it became clear that the
government had been too sanguine about its capacity to characterize
teachers as overpaid, ineffective layabouts.
Finding itself frustrated in its efforts to win public support, the
government attempted to turn its struggling political attack into a
judicial one. In line with the argument of this commentary, the
government was acting on the theory that, in court, numbers and social
history do not matter. This is why the recasting of the struggle into a
6 Supra note 1. Among other things, the Bill proposed that the school boards be deprived of
their right to tax, and gave the government of the day the power to sack boards and trustees in cases
of financial mismanagement. As will be shown below, this led to a separate legal battle.
7 The deputy minister was Veronica Lacey. The contract and its accompanying text also
mentioned the possibility of strike action by the teachers and indicated that resort to the courts
should then be the counter manoeuvre. These anticipated risks materialized and the government
responded in the way the document had argued it should: see J. Ruimy, "'Goal of Contract' $667
Million Cut: It Also Calls for 'Legal Strategy' in Event of Strike" The Toronto Star (22 October
1997) A7; and D. Girard & J. Ruimy "$660 Million School Cuts Confirmed" The Toronto Star (24
October 1997) Al.
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legal battle held out the promise that the government might offset its
losses in the public-political sphere. This too turned out less well than
the government had hoped.
III. DEMOCRACY AND THE INJUNCTION
The government applied for an injunction-that is, an order by
the court requiring identified teachers or unionists to desist from their
course of action. The basis for a labour injunction is (usually) that a
strike will do irreparable harm to a property or contract right of the
applicant. The court must, therefore, issue a cease and desist order
before it is "too late." To remind us of the utility of this legal tool in the
certified labour setting, note that any violation of the order constitutes a
contempt of court, because an identified person, specifically told to do
or, as is more frequent in capital-labour disputes, not to do something
will have defied the court's command. Contempt of court is punishable
by the imposition of a jail sentence, a fine, or any other kind of
punishment the court sees fit to devise. This prospect usually forces
strikers to go back to work, losing any advantage they might have had.
The injunction is an ideal tool for officials involved in disputes where
timing is of the essence.
It has been a draconian weapon, used with telling effect against
striking workers. Courts were so pliable when asked to issue injunctions
against trade unions at the behest of employers that it gave rise to a well-
known joke. The story is that a judge, attending a baseball game, heard
an umpire yell "Strike!" The judge leapt out of his seat and said:
"Injunction granted." This apocryphal story reflects an empirical truth.
Historically, courts assumed that if an employer gave evidence that a
strike was underway, or about to get underway, the employer was bound
to suffer irreparable harm to its property and contract rights as the result
of definable conduct. Judges would grant injunctions without more.8
8 Until some reforms were implemented, employers could obtain such strike-crippling
injunctions by way of exparte applications. This meant that employers swore an affidavit to testify to
the existence of a strike or its imminence, adding a claim that this would lead to irreparable damage
and that it had given notice to the union of its intention to apply for an injunction. As all this
happened in a rush (because the supposition was that relief was needed instantly, if not sooner), it
was often the case that unions were not represented at these hearings. The granting of anti-union
injunctions in these circumstances brought the law and courts into disrepute. This led to several
commissions of inquiry and recommendations for constraints on the all-too-willing courts: see
A.W.R. Carrothers & E.E. Palmer, Report of a Study on the Labour Injunctions in Ontario (Toronto:
Ontario Department of Labour, 1966); Ontario, Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry Into Labour
Disputes (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1968) (Chair: I.C. Rand); and Canada, Canadian Industrial
1999] 809
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The weapon was used so excessively in Ontario in the middle
1960s that law reforms had to be introduced. Curbs were put on the
judiciary's ability and eagerness to protect employers from their
disgruntled workers. Now, before a court can issue an injunction in a
labour dispute in Ontario, it must be satisfied that every effort has been
made by the applicant to avert the possibility of harm to its property and
contract rights, including seeking the help of the police. 9 The notion is
that this procedural change will stop judges from assuming that
employers will suffer irreparable damage as the result of a strike. The
employer now has at least to adduce some evidence.10
The problem for the Harris government was that, as a
government, it had no way to establish that it would suffer irreparable
Relations: The Report of Task Force on Labour Relations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) (Chair:
H.D. Woods) [hereinafter Woods Task Force].
9 See the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. In British Columbia, an NDP government
tried to take the jurisdiction of the courts over these issues away altogether: see H.W. Arthurs,
"'The Dullest Bill': Reflections on the Labour Code of British Columbia" (1974) 9 U.B.C. L. Rev.
280. A central point in this commentary is that it is not the simple bias of a few anti-worker, anti-
trade union judges that is at issue, but the fact that the legal system, as an institution in liberal
capitalist democracies such as Canada, is designed to defend individual capitalists against collectives
of workers. This should mean that the change of forum attempted in British Columbia would have
had little impact, except in a cosmetic way. There is evidence, in terms of outcomes, that the change
in forum in British Columbia was not all that significant: see J.A. Manwaring, "Legitimacy in
Labour Relations: The Courts, the British Columbia Labour Board and Secondary Picketing"
(1982) 20 Osgoode Hall LJ. 274.
10 For a very good illustration of the way in which courts have seen (and continue to see) their
role in capital-labour disputes, see Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 620
(Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Daishowa]. Picketing that in a capital-labour dispute would likely have been
classified as secondary picketing and therefore automatically enjoinable was not so characterized
(not very persuasively). The actions of the defendant picketers were perceived to be noble, a view
rarely (if ever) taken by judges when dealing with a picket line supporting a strike. The Friends of
the Lubicon were acting in support of a long-suffering group whose very existence was said to be
threatened by the applicant, a profit-seeking transnational corporation. The picketers, unlike
workers defending their own job security and way of life, were defending other people's interests.
Their stance was seen to be political, not economic. The word "seen" is crucial: the distinction is
nowhere nearly as clear as the finding in the Daishowa case purports it to be. It would be a poor
liberal democracy, the court reasoned, that stood in the way of such selfless action, even if well-
established law seemed to stand squarely in the way. In short, in order to reach a decision the court
had to endorse the contentious distinction between the political and the economic spheres, a
distinction that allows private property owners to resist the wishes of the majority in the private
sphere and gives them more political clout than their numbers warrant in the public sphere. The
distinction furthers the interest of the dominant economic class. This point will be taken up later in
this commentary. For the moment, note that the judge who was so generous to the Friends of the
Lubicon was MacPherson J.-the judge who, in the teachers' case, denied the Harris government an
injunction. In that case, too, MacPherson J. would have liked to characterize the teachers' action as
political, rather than economic. But, this distinction plainly made less sense in that context because
the teachers' self-interest was palpable, even though they claimed to be acting in the public interest.
This helps explain why the holding favouring the teachers was so narrow, and eventually, ineffective:
see infra note 35 and accompanying text.
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property or contract harm as a result of the strike. The Harris forces,
therefore, had to allege the possibility of a different kind of harm, one
that approximated the worst kind of harm imaginable in a capitalist
society, something as important as a private property or contractual loss:
interference with democratic representation. As a matter of law, it is
permissible for a government to go to court to claim that it has a
responsibility to guard the fundamental, established rights and needs of
the people if the people cannot do so themselves.11 This principle is what
the government's legal team used to ground the application for a court
order directing the teachers to cease and desist from their strike action.
The claim was that the strike would do irreparable harm to the public
interest and that this was definable at the government's behest. This
contention had two strands.
The first was that the education of Ontario's children was being
irreparably damaged by the strike,12 a somewhat puzzling argument in
that the government was busy telling the world that the striking teachers
were not delivering much by way of useful education. Wrapped up with
this argument about harm to the children of Ontario was a more realistic
but somewhat distinct argument to the effect that working parents would
be inconvenienced by the strike. Inasmuch as this was said to harm the
public interest, evidence was needed. Three days into the strike this was
not going to be easy. Indeed, MacPherson J., the judge who presided
over the government's application, was to hold that the government had
failed to provide the necessary evidence.
The government's lawyers understood the inherent weaknesses
of these lines of argument, and had put forward a third, more
fundamental and conceptual argument. Because of its nature, this third
basis grounding the application did not require factual proof. The Harris
government stressed the illegality of the teachers' withdrawal of labour.
11 See Gouriet v. Union of Postal Workers, [1978] A.C. 435 (H.L.); and Ontario (A.G.) v.
Dieleman (1994), 20 O.R. (3d) 229 at 267 (Gen. Div.).
12 The newspapers were replete with stories about poor toddlers with nothing to do, and
advice about excursions and amusements that parents might be able to enjoy with their idle
children: see, for example, M. Sheppard, "Parents Scramble for Childcare" The Toronto Star (29
October 1997) A6. This drew attention to the fact that primary schooling is about daycare as much
as it is about education. Indeed, the government, trying to assure the public that it cared about its
problems, offered a subsidy to parents who would need daycare should a strike materialize: D.
Girard & P. Small, "Daily '$40 for Care' Offer to Parents" The Toronto Star (23 October 1997) Al.
This widely publicized tactic was not that useful to the government's lawyers, who were going to
have to rest part of their case on the claim that education was being badly affected by the teachers'
strike. More useful to them was the plethora of stories about high school students enrolled in
semester courses in their final year and who, by losing a semester, or a large chunk of it, might lose
the chance of being admitted to the university of their choice.
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The argument was that, if a government permitted widespread,
intentional breaches of a validly passed law to occur, this might be seen
as carte blanche to dissidents to use extra-legal tactics. Such
governmental inaction would undermine the fabric of our democratic
society, which is governed by the rule of law. A government that stood
idly by while dissidents violated the law would be renouncing its
democratic duty.
This purported fervour for democracy by the Harris government
did not ring true to many in the province. This was, after all, the
government that had introduced Bill 26,13 which was passed without any
meaningful scrutiny, though it was to abolish forty-seven laws and give
the government new powers to close hospitals, as well as propose the
serious dilution of the right to appeal administrative decisions. This was
also the government that had tried to bar entry to the legislature of one
of Canada's cultural icons when, accompanied by some of her allies,
Karen Kain came to protest the government's cuts to the arts. This was
the government that by regulation cut welfare benefits by 22 per cent. It
was the government whose premier compared health care to "hula
hoops," the government that passed Bill 103,14 forcing the amalgamation
of local councils against the wishes of a considerable segment of the
population. It was the government that had turned the legislative
building into a fortress to avoid having to confront dissenting citizens
and that, in one truly surreal episode, charged a few protesting and
trespassing students with the antediluvian crime of intimidation of the
legislature.S
Notwithstanding its public record, the government felt safe in
using the "defender of democracy" position in court. It felt
sanguine-and this is significant to the central point of this
commentary-that the behaviour of the government, i.e., its historical
and political record, could not, and would not, be raised in a judicial
proceeding addressing a legal question. This feature of the legal system
speaks volumes about the way in which workers-whose only real
political assets are their numbers and consciousness of their class
13 Savings and RestructuringAct, S.O. 1996, c. 1.
1 4 City of Toronto Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 2.
15 See the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 51, which provides a maximum sentence of
14 years for anyone convicted of committing an act of violence to "intimidate Parliament or the
legislature of a province." The government's use of enthusiastically repressive police officers forced
it to set up a public inquiry into its attitude (as implemented by the guardian of the Legislative
Assembly, the Speaker) to the public's civil rights, and into the behaviour of the police summoned
to enforce this governmental attitude.
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history-tend to be disempowered when politics are judicialized.
As it turned out, my claim that there is an inherent limitation on
the potential of judicial politics was not supported directly by the result
in this particular case. The government's conscious attempt to abstract
the legal issues from political reality did not work, precisely because its
efforts were too blatant. Success for the government in court would have
endangered the zealously guarded legitimacy of the judiciary and, in the
end, the need for the court to protect that legitimacy trumped the
government's (much too) frank reliance on the structured anti-worker
bias built into the law.
The source of the illegality the government relied upon in its
case was the teachers' breaches of their respective collective agreements.
When the strike began, the teachers' unions had extant collective
agreements with the school boards, their members' employers. On this
point the law is clear: it is unlawful to strike during the life of a collective
agreement. Technically, therefore, the government's case that a law was
being flagrantly contravened, and that this was inimical to the public
interest, seemed an easy argument to make. The government counted on
that, but its technically-correct argument was tainted by the context in
which it was made, a context fashioned by the government itself. The
collective bargaining law by which the teachers and their employers were
bound was the very law that Bill 160 was to replace. In effect, the
teachers were in breach of the technical requirements of collective
bargaining law whose spirit and essence they were really trying to
protect. While the government was willing to leave collective bargaining
in place, its plan was to completely change the circumstances in which it
was to occur. A court could only endorse this kind of argument---even if
plausibly based on the state of the law-at risk to the judiciary's claim to
be an independent institution. The need to preserve the legitimacy of the
court was of vital concern to it, even if it did not articulate this need.
Courts rarely explain their holdings on the basis that they are necessary
to maintain the legitimacy of the judiciary-especially ones that defy
apparently well-established principles of law. Justice MacPherson,
therefore, offered different, legally plausible reasons that protected the
perception that the court was acting autonomously.
IV. JUDICIAL POLITICS
The fact that the government could come to court on such a set
of artificial arguments demonstrates the plausibility of the contention
that, in a legal context, arguments can be presented that are divorced
1999]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
from reality. Litigants are able to rely on the "internal logic" of the law.
Within those confines, the Harris government felt confident that it
would find itself on much more comfortable terrain than it occupied in
the world of social relations and politics. In court it was going to be
impermissible-because it was irrelevant to the internal logic of the
law-for the teachers to raise any of the arguments that were gaining
them so much support in the struggle for the hearts and minds of the
people.
In this situation, the teachers' lawyers were not going to be able
to offer evidence of what, loudly and publicly, they took to be the
despotic nature of the government. They were not going to be allowed to
make the argument (which they were making concretely by having
adopted a leadership role in the Days of Action activities16) that they
were acting as the front-line troops in a war waged on behalf of the many
workers of Ontario who were losing, or who had already lost, many of
their hard-fought-for protections and bargaining rights. They were not
going to be able to raise the issue that, in amalgamating municipalities
and school boards, the government was attacking self-government and
participatory rights of citizens. In short, in court the teachers were facing
the government without any of the arguments that were important to
them, arguments that relied on the recent historical context of the
political struggle and that had stood them in good stead during the battle
for public support. All that the teachers would be allowed to do, and did
do, in court was to employ one technical and one civil libertarian
argument. They won on the technical argument; neither the civil
libertarian argument,17 nor any of the political arguments listed above,
were addressed by the court.
The Harris forces failed to get the injunction they sought
because, as a matter of technical law, the judge found them to be the
16 The "Days of Action" were arranged by labour and social movements in the Fall of 1995 as
a series of protests against the Harris government and its "common sense revolution." The protests
were organized in a number of major centres around the province, including Toronto, Hamilton,
London, and Kingston.
17 Justice MacPherson stated that time constraints forbade him from considering the merits of
the Charter (Le., civil libertarian) argument: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter
Charter]. But, he did suggest that, as education policy was a political issue, the Charter argument
might have had some merit: see Ontario Teachers Federation, supra note 2 at 381. This is yet another
manifestation of MacPherson J.'s desire to classify the strike as a political one and, therefore, not
subject to the usual restraints imposed on strikes by the working classes. Yet, despite his
predilections, MacPherson J. felt the weight of precedent and carefully noted that, soon enough, the
strike might become an enjoinable one (as any other workers' strike would be), despite its political
colouring.
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wrong applicant. The government had to rely on the breach of the
collective bargaining law under which the teachers were working. That
law provided that, in the ordinary course of things, persons directly
affected by such breaches were to have remedies that they could enforce.
In the case of the teachers' walkout, their direct employers (the school
boards) had the right to go to an administrative agency and ask it to
declare the strike illegal. This could be accompanied by a cease and
desist order that, when filed in court, would have the same effect as an
injunction. The employers also had a right to seek to recover moneys for
any pecuniary losses they might suffer as a result of the illegal strike.
Other affected persons not as directly connected to the teachers as the
teachers' employers, such as school board suppliers-bus companies,
caterers, and cleaning service contractors-could also sue for any
financial losses they incurred as a result of the teachers' breach of their
obligation not to strike. In addition, the employers were entitled to
impose disciplinary sanctions on their contract-breaching employees, the
striking teachers.
In the end, the court held that, given that the potentially injured
people could bring actions that would protect them and that could
effectively put an end to the illegal strike, there was no need for the
government to act on the public's behalf. Further, in the case of
education, there is a readily available (and independent) guardian of the
public weal, an agency called the Education Relations Committee,
whose brief it is to act as an oversight agency. It may recommend that
even a legal teachers' strike should be brought to a halt if, in its expert
view, the strike puts the education of children in jeopardy. By the time
the Harris government's lawyers made their application, the Education
Relations Committee had not said a word.18 Considering all the
circumstances, MacPherson J. held that he could not accept the Harris
government's claim that a crisis for democracy existed that mandated the
extraordinary use of the court's injunctive power at the government's
behest-at least, not yet.
The court had found a way to preserve the perception of judicial
independence without legitimating the teachers' strike. The strike was
still said to be chalengeable in court by the right parties. Nothing in the
favourable decision held that the teachers were justified in using their
collective economic power for political and economic goals. That is,
18 Justice MacPherson noted that, historically, the number of days that the Education
Relations Commission permitted a strike to continue before it used its extraordinary power varied
from a low of 27 to a high of 73. A three-day strike hardly presented an educational danger worthy
of the name, even though, in this unusual case, all the schools were closed at the same time.
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while the result in the case does not demonstrate directly that
judicialization of a political struggle tends to disempower workers, the
way in which the case was fought did reveal this, and, as will be seen, so
did its fall-out. In the meantime, two further observations are offered to
underscore the claim that judicial politics is useful to the propertied class
and its political allies in that it enables them to avoid the political
spheres where history, numbers, and social relations do matter.
First, the Harris government had a majority in the legislature. It
could have passed legislation ordering the workers back to work, with
stiff penalties attached to disobedience. This has become an increasingly
popular strategy with Canadian governments of all stripes and in every
jurisdiction when faced by militant public sector workers.1 9 That the
Harris government did not use this option tells us that it judged it to be
politically inferior to going to court. One reason for this decision was
that, in order to pass back-to-work legislation, it would have had to
permit the opposition parties to participate in legislative debate. They
could be expected to make some of the teachers' real political
arguments, arguments about the necessity of governmental
accountability, about the lack of public consultation, about the alleged
cutbacks to funding, about the alleged distortion of evidence in respect
of the quality of Ontario education, and about the claimed
disenfranchising of the parents. That is, they could be expected to use
the legislative debate to raise many of the real political arguments that
had prompted.the job action and that had enabled the teachers to make
a case that resonated with the public. This was not an appealing
prospect. By contrast, these awkward arguments were certain to be
deemed irrelevant in court. 20
The second point is to note that, while the ploy of using the court
as a political forum permitted the government to make the argument
19 For overviews, see L. Panitch & D. Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From
Wage Controls to Social Contract, 2d ed. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1993); and D. Drache & H.J.
Glasbeek, The Changing Workplace: Reshaping Canada's Industrial Relations System (Toronto:
Lorimer, 1992).
20 There may have been other related reasons not to go the legislative route. In part, the
government was surprised at the ability of the teachers' to maintain solidarity in a united front; it
had hoped to beat the unions down. Its view was that the unions' call for a strike would be rejected
by much of the thought-to-be conservative membership. The government, therefore, did not want to
play its legislative card prematurely. In part, its strategy was tied to provoking a partial illegal
walkout to help the government paint the striking teachers as isolated, selfish persons who did not
care for their students. When this, belatedly, was seen not to work, the government may have
thought that a declaration by a court that the strikers should return to work would allow it to regain
some of the moral high ground that it had lost in the weeks leading up to the strike. I will return to
this legitimating power of the court below.
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that the teachers' behaviour threatened democratic institutions, the
reverse was not true. There was no way in which the internal logic of the
law allowed the workers to put forward evidence to show that it was the
government's behaviour that was putting democracy at risk. This was
also true of the civil libertarian claim that the teachers' lawyers advanced
to ward off the government's legal case, should the government have
succeeded in establishing the technical prerequisites for the granting of
an injunction. As noted, the court was able to ignore this second strand
to the teachers' bow, but its nature is of interest to the arguments in this
commentary.
The teachers had also made the argument that the Charter2l
guaranteed them the right to demonstrate, to speak freely, and to
assemble. They were saying that, if the court granted the injunction in
the terms the government had requested, it would have the same effect
as a law passed by the government that expressly denied them rights
guaranteed by the Charter, including the rights of free speech and of
assembly. Such denial, if done by way of legislative act, would have given
them an arguable case that a court should strike down such a law as
unconstitutional. It followed that the court should not grant an
injunction whose effects, if generated by a different institution, might
have been ruled constitutionally flawed.2 2
21 Supra note 17.
22 As a matter of case law, the argument the teachers were making was far from open-and-
shut. The Supreme Court of Canada has handed down a decision that made this part of the
teachers' case a difficult one. In RW.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573
[hereinafter Dolphin Delivery] the Supreme Court held that a judicial injunction of a secondary
target picket interfered with the workers' right to free speech, but that this was not unconstitutional
because a decree by a court was not a governmental act that was subject to the Charter. Note the
bizarre form of logic that is integral to legal politics. Even McIntyre J., a member of the Supreme
Court in Dolphin Delivery, was moved to say that to hold a State-appointed judge, whose central task
is to uphold the political-legal structure of the State, not to be a governmental actor might be
incomprehensible to anyone not in law: Dolphin Delivery, ibid. at 600. From the teachers'
perspective, Dolphin Delivery presented a formidable obstacle. But legal logic is such that it was not
an insurmountable one. There was a plausible argument to the effect that, unlike in Dolphin
Delivery, in the teachers' case the government itself was applying for a court order, arguably making
such an order, if made, a governmental act. And, in legal politics, an argument need not make
political or real-world sense; it is sufficient if it is plausible. Lawyers may, and indeed are expected
to make it. So, the argument would have been made and it would have been bolstered by another
curious pronouncement of the Supreme Court, one made in B.C.G.E. U. v. British Columbia (A.G.),
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 [hereinafter BCGEU]. In BCGEU it was held that, when a judge issued an injunction
without having been asked for it, the judge was not acting as a non-governmental actor as the judge
in Dolphin Delivery had been held to be. In BCGEU the judge was a governmental actor because the
judge's initiative was one to be used by the attorney general-clearly a governmental actor-and,
therefore, the judge was just a surrogate of the attorney general. There is a plausible justification in
law for the use of such sophistry, but it is not a justification that is politically acceptable. Note,
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It is easy to see how different this kind of argument is to the ones
raised in the public political sphere. The point of the civil libertarian
argument was a claim to have a right to demonstrate, simpliciter,
respected. What was being asserted were liberal citizenry rights. The
Charter guarantees freedoms, subject to any reasonable limits that may
be required by a free and democratic society. In a liberal democracy, the
right to band together to speak, to petition, to lobby, and to support
electoral parties, will be protected. These are the kinds of rights that the
teachers claimed were being infringed. What was not being claimed by
means of the Charter argument, then, was the ideological and political
right of teachers to use their combined material-economic power to fight
a politically repressive government. When using the Charter, the teachers
were not relying on the claim that there was a compelling democratic
need to meet a repressive government with force. What was not being
sought in court by the teachers was the right to use their numbers and
the withdrawal of their labour power to achieve both their political and
economic aims. They claimed that they should have a right to speak,
petition, lobby, and vote as individuals do. They were having to dress up
what they were really doing (using the coercive power of the strike) in
non-threatening clothes to make it attract Charter protection.
Eventually the teachers did win in court, and a win is better than
a loss. It is perhaps more accurate to say that the government did not get
what it wanted from the court. If the government's application had
succeeded, there would have been a direct order by a court that, at the
very least, would have told the public that an unbiased umpire had held
the teachers and their unions to be acting anti-socially. The teachers
might have gone back earlier than they did, although, logistically
speaking, it could not have been much earlier. The "win" for the
teachers, in reality, was that they did not lose any ground in the
propaganda war. The government did not lose anythiig tangible and the
teachers did not gain anything concrete.
V. THE ANTI-WORKER ARCHITECTURE OF THE LAW
Canada characterizes itself as a mature, liberal, capitalist
democracy. The attributes of liberalism and electoral democracy help
further the legitimacy of capitalism. Law not only supports the tenets of
liberalism (and democratic forms within the framework of those liberal
tenets), but also facilitates market transactions that, in turn, enhance
however, that the difficult-to-reconcile holdings in Dolphin Delivery and ICGEU led to the same
result: the validation of an anti-worker injunction.
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both the instrumental needs of capitalism and the ideology of liberal
democracy. In addition, law embeds and naturalizes some essential
features of capitalism. These include the ability of wealth owners to
enter into enforceable agreements with non-wealth owners for the
purchase of the only thing the non-wealth owners own: their labour
power. While this commentary is not the place to debate the role of law
in capitalist relations of production, a few observations will be offered to
lay the basis for the central argument, namely, that as a result of law's
liberalism and market-supporting roles, the legalization of politics-
especially when capital and labour come into direct conflict-is likely to
favour capital.
To assert that liberal law plays a central role in the maintenance.
and perpetuation of capitalist relations of production,23 however, is not
the same as saying that law automatically reflects the needs of
capitalism. This would be too crude a view of the way in which law
works. Law does more than reflect the fundamental needs of capitalism,
in part because it is not clear what the precise scope of the needs it has
in any one place at any one time.2 4 The view I take I share with Eric
Tucker;25 namely that, in the result, law has some autonomy. The idea
here is that law helps in the establishment and maintenance of the
necessary conditions for capitalism to exist. Law also provides the tools
to facilitate its workings and to establish a climate to make it
acceptable. 26 In Marxian language, law plays a part in constituting both
23 This section of the article relies heavily on the very useful analytical framework provided by
E. Tucker, "The Law of Employers' Liability in Ontario 1861-1900: The Search for a Theory"
(1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 213 [hereinafter "Law of Employers' Liability"]. See also R. Gordon,
"Historicism in Legal Scholarship" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1017.
24 There are some very important scholars who do think of the law as merely reflective of
capitalism's needs, although there is a good deal of debate amongst them about the mechanisms
that allow law to behave reflectively: see L. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2d ed. (New
York: Simon & Shuster, 1985); M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960. The
Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); R.A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992); G. Priest, "The Common Law Process and
the Selection of Efficient Rules" (1977) 6 J. Legal Stud. 65; and P. Gabel, "Intention and Structure
in Contractual Conditions" (1977) 61 Minn. L. Rev. 601.
25 See "Law of Employers' Liability," supra note 23.
26 As the law does not automatically reflect the needs of the base and, as the contents of the
base are historically and materially contingent, to say that the law plays a dual role does not tell us
how it does play that role. This problematic has given rise to much debate: see M. Tushnet, "Truth,
Justice and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies"
(1979) 57 Texas. L. Rev. 1307; W. Holt, "Morton Horwitz and the Transformation of American
Legal History" (1982) 23 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 663; E.O. Wright, Class, Crisis and the State
(London: Verso, 1979); and I. Balbus, "Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the
'Relative Autonomy' of the Law" (1977) 11 L. & Soc'y Rev. 572.
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the (material) base and, as already noted, the (non-material)
superstructure in the maintenance and furtherance of capitalist relations
of production.
In mature capitalism, the base contains the constructs of private
property and private contract. Alan Stone has argued that it is
impossible to express property relations in anything but legal language,
giving law a crucial role.2 7 Again, for this statement to remain true, it is
not necessary that the constructs of private property and private contract
have to have a specific meaning or content. Indeed, it would be
ahistorical, acontextual, i.e., profoundly anti-Marxian, to hold that the
meaning and content of these constructs be written in stone. Historical
struggles and material conditions will dictate the scope of these
constructs found in the base. It is a characteristic of mature capitalism
that the scope of property rights and of the contract for wages (the
defining attribute of mature capitalist relations of production) will have
been cut down by a state that has been under prolonged pressure to off-
set the more adverse effects of the extraction of surplus value from the
working class. This is what has happened in Canada and is reflected in
the legal capital-labour regulatory regimes that have been developed.
A. Legal Regimes
There are three major regimes that govern labour relations in
Canada. Under the common law of contract, many28 employers and
employees are related by an individual contract of employment. Its
governing doctrines were developed by common law courts in the
context of their overriding goals, namely the protection of private
property and of the market-based notion that the terms of a contract are
voluntarily entered into between de jure equal individuals and should be
treated as sacrosanct. Second, precisely because the terms of contracts of
employment turn out to be so miserable for so many of the workers left
to bargain as discrete individuals, the State has mediated the harshness
of these free market outcomes by imposing minimum standards (in
respect of such matters as wages, hours of work, mandated vacation, and
27 See A. Stone, "The Place of Law in the Marxian Structure-Superstructure Archetype"
(1985) 19 L. & Soc'y Rev. 39. Stone would include credit as a construct of the base in modern
capitalism.
28 An increasing number of workers are contract or contingent workers: see Industry Canada,
Small Business in Canada: A Statistical Overview (Ottawa: Entrepreneurship and Small Business
Office, 1995) [hereinafter Small Business in Canada]. See also discussion infra note 63.
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minimum notice periods). This has been done by direct legislative
intervention. 29 Third, there is statutorily permitted collective bargaining.
This forces an employer-note the anti-liberal, anti-market character of
this requirement-to negotiate in good faith with a trade union freely
chosen as an agent by its employees in order to conclude a legally-
binding collective agreement. The parties-the employer and the trade
union-may resort to economic warfare (after satisfying a number of
statutory requirements) to force the other party to come to terms. That
is, after compelling employers and employees to bargain, the State wants
the outcome to be the result of voluntary deal-making. This short
account of the way in which capitalist relations of production have been
mediated in Canada brings us to examine how the architecture of liberal
law naturally favours capital's interests in the context of capital-labour
disputes. The argument is that this privileging of capital is always part of
the story, even when the State has set out specifically-as it has in
establishing the collective bargaining regime-to offset some of the
more obvious advantages unmediated liberal law bestows on employers.
The collective bargaining scheme of capital-labour regulations
goes the furthest in terms of interference with the individual employer-
employee model. Nevertheless, it remains posited on precepts that are
integral to an individualistic competitive model.3 0 The employer and its
workers' bargaining agent, the local union, are supposed to be on an
isolated economic island, divorced from other people's interests. The
scheme, then, is really the individual employer-employee bargaining
29 See, for example, Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.14. In addition, other kinds
of mediating State interventions emerged. Anti-discrimination laws in respect of employment
opportunity, remuneration, and security, all play a part in off-setting some of the socially and
politically unacceptable outcomes of a legal regulation system based on the pristine notions of the
sacrosanct nature of private property ownership, and the unequal power it bestows on property
owners over non-property owners in an unfettered market system.
30 1 have made this argument extensively in various places. See, for example, H.J. Glasbeek,
"The Contract of Employment at Common Law" in J. Anderson & M. Gundersen, eds., Union-
Management Relations in Canada (Don Mills, Ont.: Addison-Wellesley, 1982) 47; H.J. Glasbeek,
"Labour Relations Law as Mechanism of Adjustment" (1987) Osgoode Hall L.J. 179; H.J.
Glasbeek, "Agenda for Canadian Labour Law Reform: A Little Less Liberal Law, Much More
Democratic Socialist Politics" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 233. See also the comments made by the
Woods Task Force, supra note 8 at para. 30, describing Canada's collective bargaining system as a
functional component of political economy: "The underlying concepts of the free individual, private
property and freedom of contract have produced an essentially capitalistic, although mixed
enterprise economy." By contrast, Canada's leading liberal law pluralist, Bora Laskin, made it a
lifetime project to propagate the idea that, with the advent of collective bargaining, the individual
contract of employment no longer had any functional role in a unionized setting. Inasmuch as it was
a manifestation of old class divisions and unequal power, it was, he implicitly argued, a dinosaur: see
Re U.A.W, Local 458 & Cockshutt Farm Equipment Ltd. (1959), 9 L.A.C. 324; and McGavin
Toastmaster Ltd. v.Ainscough, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 718.
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scheme, complemented by a limited privilege for the workers at that
place of employment to bargain as a collective and to strike in certain
very limited circumstances. Local unions with bargaining rights may call
for a strike only for the purpose of reaching a collective agreement, and
then only after they have gone through some compulsory delays. The
right to strike really only exists at this scheduled point of time, only for
this economic agreement-making purpose, and only in respect of the
particular employer for which the bargaining agency exists. As a
consequence all support for an employer's workers by way of secondary
actions and boycotts is treated with deep suspicion by the institution
charged with the protection of individual property and contract rights:
the courts. Indeed, the judges have tended to treat such secondary
activities as illegal "per se." While wrong, there is a case that is
constantly cited in support of per se illegality: Hersees of Woodstock Ltd.
v. Goldstein.3 1
B. Free Speech and Picketing
What is most interesting about the hold of Hersees on the
judiciary's vision of the legal status of secondary labour actions is that
the decision was technically wrong. The defendants were restrained from
engaging in a secondary boycott on the basis that they committed the
tort of inducing a breach of contract, a cause of action specifically
devised to provide added protection to property and contract rights. But,
the applicant for the injunction was the party breaching the contract,
rather than the victim of the breach of contract, as the cause of action
requires 3 2 Yet, so deeply ingrained is the judicial instinctive
understanding that it is the court's role to guard against the danger that
workers might enlarge their collective bargaining privileges granted by
special statute, that this poorly reasoned judgment is often seen as
binding on a court to hold that there is no choice but to restrain
secondary boycotts.
This entrenchment of anti-collectivism is what created difficulties
for MacPherson J. in the Daishowa case.33 The sympathy of this judge
31 Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v. Goldstein (1963), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 449 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter
Hersees].
32 This fact is much commented upon. See, for example, H.W. Arthurs, "Picketing, Public
Policy and Per Se Illegality" (1963) 41 Can. Bar Rev. 580; and H.W. Arthurs, "Tort Liability for
Strikes in Canada: Some Problems of Judicial Workmanship" (1960) 38 Can. Bar Rev. 346.
33 Supra note 10.
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for the Friends of the Lubicon was even more obvious than his sympathy
for the teachers' cause in the Bill 160 case. But he was faced with Hersees
and its progeny. While Hersees was clear in its anti-worker bias, liberal
law purports to be evenhanded. Justice MacPherson was confronted with
the implicit argument that the Hersees logic applied to any secondary
boycott. Rather than say that it only applied to the collective use of
power by workers-a statement that would attract attention to the
essential, but oft-denied, nature of law-MacPherson J. finessed the
issue. He sidled out of the problem by characterizing the Friends of the
Lubicon's boycott as a primary one and, therefore, not conduct that was
automatically enjoinable. This served the purpose: he was able to craft a
progressive result while leaving a reactionary labour law rule intact.
The reason the Hersees conclusion has been challenged rarely,
despite the flawed methodology that begot it, is that it was posited on
the fundamental proposition that private property, or more directly the
conduct of owners of private property, is to be protected from
collectivized attacks by the non-propertied, by workers. That is, the
leading judgment of Aylesworth J.A. in Hersees may always have been
bad black letter law, but the fact that it explicitly reinforced law's role in
fortifying the material base of capitalism made it a valuable judgment.
After all, Aylesworth J.A. had made no bones about what the law ought
to do, regardless of any formal, methodological requirements. He wrote
that the picketed, property-owning secondary target "has a right lawfully
to engage in its business of retailing merchandise to the public ...
Therefore, the right, if there be such a right, of the [union] to engage in
secondary picketing of appellant's premises must give way to appellant's
right to trade."34 Justice Aylesworth had already found, wrongly, that
there was no such right, indicating by this additional argument how clear
he was that there should not be one. The right of the union to engage in
secondary picketing, he wrote,
assuming it to be a legal right, is exercised for the benefit of a particular class only while [the
appellant's right to trade] is a right far more fundamental and of far greater importance, in
my view, as one which in its exercise affects and is for the benefit of the community at large.
3 5
This was a clear, and therefore welcome statement about the way
in which liberal law should be expected to support existing class positions
in Canada's version of capitalist relations of production. While it is rare
for judges to acknowledge the class-based nature of the legal regulation
of capital-labour relations, this starting point- has helped to set the
3 4 Hersees, supra note 31 at 454.
3 5 bi& [emphasis added].
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boundaries for the statutorily devised collective bargaining schemes. But
as the same judiciary that has created these limits on behalf of capital
also is charged with the protection and promotion of liberal democratic
values, it is bound to be conflicted from time to time. This problem was
brought out by two recent cases.36
In KMart,37 the Supreme Court of Canada was confronted with
an argument that its recently bestowed explicit mandate to safeguard the
liberal values in the entrenched Charter required it to abandon the class-
based approach to boycotts and picketing that pervaded judicial
decisions and labour relations jurisprudence. In its response, the
Supreme Court used purple prose to declare its devotion to the liberal
idea of free speech-that is, to Charter values-while ensuring that the
legal scope of secondary boycotts by trade unions was not enlarged
beyond what a class-based approach to capital-labour relations
demanded.
The facts were that a bargaining unit of (mostly) part-time
female workers had been locked out for six months by two KMart stores.
In desperation, the union handed out leaflets at other KMart outlets.
These other stores were not (legally) involved with the dispute and,
hence, were secondary sites. The leaflets alleged that the primary target
KMart stores had engaged in unfair practices and urged customers to
shop elsewhere. There were no attempts to slow the flow of customers
and no physical barriers to ingress and egress were established.
Nonetheless, this leafleting exercise was restrained by the appropriate
labour relations agency because it violated British Columbia's collective
bargaining statute.38 The Supreme Court was faced with the argument
that picketing was, in part, an exercise in free speech,39 and that the
impugned provision of the British Columbia statute violated section 2(b)
of the Charter. The Court agreed. But the Court did not declare the
spirit that underpinned Hersees and its offspring dead. To the contrary,
the Court went out of its way to make sure that the freedom that it was
granting trade unions to engage in secondary actions remained under
36 See U.F.C. W.; Local 1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 [hereinafter KMart];
and Alisco Building Products Ltd. v. U.F.C.W., Local 1288P, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1136 [hereinafter
AlIsco].
37 This discussion centres upon KMart. For the purpose of this commentary, the judicial
reasoning in the companion case, AlIsco, was the same.
38 When the action arose this was the Industrial Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212. By the
time the matter had reached the Supreme Court of Canada it had been replaced by the Labour
Relations Code, S.B.C. 1992, c. 82.
39 It had been so declared by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dolphin Delivery, supra note 22.
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tight wraps. Its holding rested on the fact that, while in this case the
leafleters' motive was to generate some economic pressure on the
KMart enterprise to obtain a better deal from the primary target, their
conduct left the economic freedom of the leafleted consumers totally
unfettered. They were left to decide for themselves whether to deal with
KMart or not. The pressure on them was no different in kind than that
which was routinely exerted on them by radio, television, newspapers, or
junk mail advertising. 40 According to the Court, this kind of marketplace
freedom of speech should not be fettered and, to the extent it did so, the
British Columbia legislation was held to be unconstitutional. But all
other sorts of secondary boycotts and picketing could still be restrained.
The Supreme Court held that if the leafleters' message had been
inaccurate;41 if they had suggested that the secondary sites were not
neutral; if there had been enough leafleters to form something like a
picket line that made people believe that they could not move freely; if
there had been any trespass, assault, any inducing of breach of contract
or commercial relations; if there had been any economic pressure on the
secondary sites' employees not to work-if, in effect, any of the facts had
existed that had motivated the decision in Hersees-legislative and
administrative restraints would be constitutional, even if free speech
rights had to be blunted. 42 As if to drive home the narrow extent of its
decision to allow some secondary picketing, the Supreme Court
explicitly approved that portion of McIntyre J.'s judgment in Dolphin
Delivery, where he had acknowledged that, as economic conflict had
been legitimated, "[i]t is reasonable to restrain picketing so that the
conflict will not escalate beyond the actual parties. While picketing is, no
40 See KMart, supra note 36 at 1115-16. This is not the place to discuss the point, but several
things are of interest. First, the idea that free speech is worthy of protection if it is commercial
speech, provided that it advanced idealized, atomized market operations, lies at the heart of this
argument. This speaks volumes of the Court's instinctive support for liberal values provided they
dovetail with the aims of its idealized notions of market capitalism. Second, the Court must have
been aware that consumer boycotts aimed at some of the uglier exploitations in a globalized
context-from South Africa, to Nike, Gap, and Levi-Strauss boycotts-were used by respectable
civil libertarians who, in a market-oriented world, felt themselves forced to use market instruments.
It must have been counter-intuitive to craft a decision that would apply a doctrine developed to
contain the local powers of trade unions in a totally different political milieu to these kinds of
political activities.
41 The placards in Hersees, supra note 31, were said to be misleading because they suggested
that the secondary site was not neutral. For an early example applying this Hersees-derived approach
in the consumer protest setting, see Canadian Tire v. Desmond, [1972] 2 O.R. 60 (H.C.).
42 Of course, the legislators, courts, and boards never had made all apparently secondary
boycotts enjoinable, per se. Such picketing is lawful if the secondary target can be classified as an
ally of the primary target and if no other unlawful acts are committed.
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doubt, a legislative weapon to be employed in a labour dispute ... it
should not be permitted to harm others."43
Without being explicit about it, the Supreme Court has
reinforced the position that judge-made law is there to help confine the
gains made by labour in the public democratic sphere to the extent this
can be done within the tenets of liberalism. This dovetails with the
Court's approach to the right to strike. It is well known that the Supreme
Court derisorily dismissed the trade unions' claim that the Charter
guarantee of freedom of association prevented governments from
suspending workers' collective bargaining and, otherwise, legalized
rights to strike. The Supreme Court held that the only right
created-and only relatively recently, at that-was a statutory privilege
to use collective power in a narrow setting for a limited purpose during a
clearly defined time. This, said the justices, was hardly as fundamental a
right as, say, free speech was. In the end the freedom of association
guaranteed by the Charter turns out to be the right to associate to further
the political rights of individuals, not the right to associate to pursue
their economic and political rights as a class.44 This constitutional
chicken came home to roost in the struggles over Bill 160 that followed
the strike.
C. .Ontario Teachers' Federation and Free Speech
Under the pre-Bill 160 legislative regime,45 principals and vice-
principals were included in the teachers' bargaining units. Unlike their
teaching colleagues, however, they were not allowed to go on strike
43 Dolphin Delivery, supra note 22 at 591, McIntyre J. This is not to say that the KMart and
Alisco decisions do not say anything new. In fact, the tolerance for consumer boycotts, when
conducted in the approved manner, does away with the obfuscating reasoning to which MacPherson
J. had resort in Daishowa, supra note 10. It is no longer necessary to assume that consumer boycotts
are illegal, as was the case in earlier rulings: see, for example, Pietro Culotta Grapes v. Moses (1968),
1 O.R. 89 (H.C.); and Darrigo's Grape Juice v. Masterson, [1971] 3 O.R. 772 (H.C.).
44 See Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313;
P.S.A.C. v. Canada (A.G.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; and R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R.
460. There were dissents by Dickson C.J. and Wilson J., who believed that freedom to associate
should include both the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike, subject to section 1 of
the Charter. Chief Justice Dickson found that the right to strike was constitutionally abrogated by
the government in two of the cases before the Court; Wilson J. found no such justification. The
majority, of course, never did have to get to the section 1 arguments. Their view was endorsed in
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2
S.C.R. 367.
45 See School Boards and Teachers Collective Negotiations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.2, particularly
section 64.
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when it became legal to do so for the bargaining unit. When the Harris
government introduced its Fewer School Boards Act,46 it was widely
rumoured that principals and vice-principals would loge their right to
belong to the appropriate teachers' bargaining unit. Unsurprisingly, this
issue became a subject of hot bargaining in the lead-up to the
introduction of Bill 160. After all, there were about 3,000 principals and
5,000 vice-principals. If nothing else, the loss of 8,000 members would be
a serious blow for the unions. As a consequence of the bargaining, the
minister of education announced that the proposed restructuring of the
education system would not require the removal of principals and vice-
principals from teacher bargaining units.47 True to its word, the
government did not include such a requirement when it did introduce
Bill 160.
Justice MacPherson handed down his decision denying the
government's application for an injunction on 3 November. By 7
November, three of the striking unions had agreed to go back to work
and by 9 November the hold-outs declared an end to their strike. But
even before any of the workers decided to return to work, on 5
November the government had tabled its amendments to Bill 160. They
included a draconian clause affecting the principals and vice-principals. 48
It was draconian because, while the government did not literally break
its promise, it introduced legislation that had this effect. It gave
principals and vice-principals an option: they could remain as principals
or vice-principals or they could resign from their positions and become
members of the appropriate teacher bargaining unit. Should they choose
the former option, their conditions of employment would be set by the
government. This put principals and vice-principals between a rock and
a hard place.
The Teachers' Federation fought these amendments in court.49
46 Supra note 5.
47 This was one of two concessions the government made before introducing Bill 160. The
other concerned provisions that would have permitted non-certified persons (Le., cheaper people)
to do some tasks ordinarily carried out by certified teachers. The Ontario College of Teachers,
which sees it as its mandate to oversee and guarantee professional standards and ethics, managed to
have these offending provisions withdrawn: see D.M. Kennedy "Prompt Action Wins Changes to
Bill 160" Professionally Speaking (December 1997) at 4, 10-11.
48 This underscores, like nothing else can, how little the judicial victory was worth to the
teachers' unions.
49 O.T.F. v. Ontario (A.G.) (1998), 37 C.C.E.L. (2d) 56 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Ontario
Teacher's Federation I]. The Ontario Teachers' Federation is an umbrella group whose affiliates
include the Ontario Public School Teachers' Federation, the Federation of Women Teachers'
Association of Ontario, the Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation, the Ontario English
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Its argument was that these provisions interfered with the Charter's
guarantee of freedom of association and of free speech. It lost. Justice
Southey gave the freedom of association claim short shrift. He pointed
to a number of Supreme Court decisionsO and held that it was now too
late to claim that the guarantee of freedom of association bestowed a
guarantee either of a right to bargain collectively or of a right to strike.S1
The Teachers' Federation also had claimed that the legislative option
given to the principals and vice-principals was an attack on their free
speech rights. The argument here was that the government had
introduced the option as a form of retaliation. The principals and vice-
principals had honoured the teachers' picket lines during the strike,
despite requests from some school boards, and hectoring from the
government, to abide by the law that prohibited principals and vice-
principals from participating in strikes. As picketing was a form of
speech (as well as a tool of economic warfare),52 this legislative attack, it
was argued, should be seen as a restraint on free speech because it was
punishing people who were exercising their right to engage in it. Justice
Southey did not accept this argument.
His Lordship went to great lengths to show that the question as
to whether or not principals and vice-principals should be allowed to be
Catholic Teachers' Association and L'Association des enseignantes et des enseignants franco-
ontariens.
50 See note 44, supra.
51 In support, Southey J. cited the judgment of Sharpe J. in Dunmore v. Ontario (A.G.) (1998),
37 O.R. (3d) 287 (Gen. Div.). In that case it was held that the exclusion of agricultural workers from
the benefits of association under the statutory labour relations regime did not violate the freedom
of association of agricultural workers. In the context of this commentary's argument, it is worth
noting that Sharpe J. pointed out that agricultural workers could still associate, and even form a
union, if they so wished. The fact that this would not give them the rights and protection of the
legislation and that they, therefore, could be easily victimized by employers did not concern him.
They technically (uselessly) still had the freedom to associate and their likely victimization by
private employers would not offend the Charter because it would not be the result of governmental
conduct. The effective repressive use of private economic power is not to be recognized as the use
of impermissible force in a liberal capitalist democratic economy. The significance of liberal law's
distinction between the political and the economic could not be made more obvious. Similarly,
Sharpe J. rejected an argument that agricultural workers, being denied legal rights granted to other
workers, were being discriminated against contrary to section 15 of the Charter. His argument was
that agricultural workers were not being picked on because of their individual traits (which were as
varied as those found in the general population), nor was the occupational category of agricultural
workers a category that attracts Charter protection as would a category based on gender or age. The
idea that agricultural workers were part of a larger unified class, the workers-for-wages class, that
should be accorded protection was not considered relevant because the basis of Charter protection is
the assumption of a liberal pluralist polity. A class polity cannot be imagined. This, too, underscores
the arguments put forward in this commentary: law plays a role in the maintenance of capitalist
relations of production by hiding their class nature.
52 As has been accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dolphin Delivery, supra note 22.
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members of teacher bargaining units had been the subject of inquiry and
debate for many years. There always had been those who argued that as
they had managerial functions, they should not be included in the same
bargaining units. Hence, Southey J. held that, as the principals' and vice-
principals' role in the strike had brought home the need to resolve the
issue once and for all, the government's legislative measure had a
plausible rationale other than the taking away of a Charter right. Justice
Southey said: "The impugned legislation does not prohibit them
[directly] from joining a teachers' strike ... The authorities which hold
that there is no constitutionally protected right to strike are quite
inconsistent with including the right to strike in activities protected by
the Charter's guarantee of freedom of expression."53 It was game, set and
match: the mere collectivist economic tool of striking cannot be given the
same standing as an individual's political right to speak, even if the
former supports the latter.54
D. Limits of Law, Limits of Workers' Power
Even in the sphere where workers have won the greatest
protection from capital-labour regulating law-collective
bargaining-the underlying architecture of law continues to favour
individual property owners over the masses of non-property owners. It
does so in two ways: by the continued privileging of private property and
contract concepts and by splitting the political from the economic
spheres whenever possible.
Property law starts off from the presumption that employers may
do with their property (i.e., their capital, their equipment, their workers)
as they like. Only if the law or workers put restraints on them will it be
53 Ontario Teachers' Federation II, supra note 49 at 67.
54 This was buttressed by the Court's dismissal of another Charter argument. Section 7 of the
Charter protects the life, liberty, and security of "everyone." The Court, in line with well-established
authorities, held that section 7 does not protect mere economic interests and, therefore, legislation
that made it impossible for principals and vice-principals to belong to a teacher bargaining unit did
not contravene section 7. Presumably, the freedom to associate as they chose was merely economic
because the goal of association in this case was economic collective bargaining only. The right to
participate democratically in the setting of living standards and in the daily governance of workplace
relations are at best incidental to economic activity and, apparently, have nothing to do with life,
liberty, and security, even though, when the courts want to sound sympathetic in a context where
their sentiments do not affect their decision, they will go on at length about the dignity and self-
esteem derived from work: see KMart, supra note 36 at 1101-02. The artificiality of the legally
endorsed distinction between the political and the economic spheres, on which capitalism thrives,
could not be more plain.
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otherwise. The law may do so where, say, the body count of dead and
maimed workers gets so high that the legislature has had to step in to
impose minimum standards of safety, or where a restriction on the
number of hours a worker may be forced to work (as the result of a
"freely" negotiated contract) has had to be imposed. Such legal rules are
a reflection of working-class pressure from below and pressure from
capitalists, who see the need to mediate to legitimate the system from
which they profit, from above. The owners' prerogative5 5 may also be
pared back if workers have enough bargaining power to limit it. But,
whatever the extent of such limitations on the prerogative, there remain
two largely untouched, but crucial ways in which the law supports the
capitalist agenda. The law assumes, and thereby ensures, that the
product of the worker's labour belongs to the employer. In Marxian
terms, the law assumes that the surplus value (the difference between
the contractually-won wages and the value of the worker's output) may
be kept by the employer.5 6 And, to make sure that the employer-who,
through the contract of employment, purchases the worker's capacity,
i.e., his or her labour power--can extract surplus value from the worker,
the la* imposes a duty on the worker to obey the employer's reasonable
orders.5 7 In short, the starting position of the law encapsulates the
coercive aspect of employment contracts. After all, only the employer
-who has a choice as to whether or not to invest capital or to live on
it-truly has a discretion as to whether or not to enter into an
employment contract. The worker, in order to live, must enter into such
a contract. If he or she is well placed, it may be possible to choose the
employer to whom labour power is sold, but he or she must sell it. From
55 Every collective agreement (and, of course, every individual contract of employment)
contains an explicit or implied "prerogative of management" or "residual managerial rights" clause.
The dictionary defines "prerogative," inter alia, as: "a right or privilege exclusive to an individual or
class ... [T]he right of the sovereign, theoretically subject to no restriction": The Concise Oxford
Dictionary, 8th ed.
56 For a neat expos6 of how this "natural" process is nothing of the kind, see R. Fischl, "Some
Realism about Critical Legal Studies" (1987) 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 505 at 527.
57 The fact that the word "reasonable" provides a contested terrain-especially in the
unionized setting-does not affect the argument in the text, namely, that the law assumes and
further embeds the superior-subordinate nexus of employment relations to the advantage of the
employer. For the use of this revealing description of the nature of employment, see Woods Task
Force, supra note 8 at para. 291; and 0. Kahn-Freund, Labourand the Law, 2d ed. (London: Stevens
& Sons, 1972) at 7: "There can be no employment relationship without a power to command and a
duty to obey, that is without the element of subordination in which lawyers rightly see the hallmark
of the 'contract of employment."'
[VOL. 37 No. 4
Ontario Teachers and the Courts
the worker's perspective, the contract is never one freely entered into.5 8
The law, then, has naturalized the coercive nature of the
employment contract and has made employer-favouring (i.e., property-
favouring) rules seem normal, unexceptional. The law is effective in
these ways because its legitimacy, as an institution, is rarely put in issue.
Judges are given the trappings of independence. In populist renditions,
they are portrayed as servants of norms and the appliers of rational
evaluative criteria to these norms that came into existence without their
help.59 They are represented as trained experts, who owe no obligation
except the integrity of the legal system and, therefore, will apply the
shared consensus as they find it in law without fear of prejudice or hope
of favour.
This gives clout to the legal system's efforts to maintain a
separation between the political and the economic spheres. As noted,
when the regulation of direct conflict between capital and labour comes
before courts and labour tribunals, the limitations imposed on the use of
collective economic power for political purposes are stringently
enforced. The underlying legal logic is simple enough. Collective
bargaining was initially designed for the private economic sphere only,
and the permitted bargaining is to be engaged in on an employer-by-
employer basis. It follows that workers cannot make political demands of
the (private sector) employers. Such demands, especially if supported by
strikes, will be inappropriate because the employer cannot satisfy them.
While this limitation on the use of collective worker power
makes legal sense, it also makes capitalist sense. What it means is that
workers cannot use their economic power to attain political goals. Their
only economic right in the political setting is to "threaten" a government
58 A founder of Australian conciliation and arbitration defended the scheme he helped
establish to overcome the power of pristine private property and contract law, as follows:
The power of the employer to withhold bread is a much more effective weapon than the
power of the employee to refuse labour. Freedom of contract under such circumstances is
surely misnamed; it should rather be called despotism in contract ... [t]he worker is in the
same position as Esau, when he surrendered his birthright for a square meal, or as a
traveller, when he had to give up his money to a highwayman for the privilege of life
Federated Engine-Drivers' & Firemen's Assn. of Australasia v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co. (1911), 5
C.A.R. 1 at 2, Higgins J.
59 Of course, few academics would say that judges never make law. But, the point of the text is
that it is the imagery of the judiciary as an independent institution that has no desire or incentive to
favour any one person, group, or class, that gives deeply coercive concepts, such as the judicially
developed rights attached to private property and contract, their legitimacy. For an example of how
this characterization of law's legitimacy works, note how, in the highly politicized unity battle, the
federal government reached out to the Supreme Court of Canada in the hope that its
"independent," "objective" opinion would give it political bargaining chips that would carry moral
authority: see Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
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that they will withdraw their labour as individuals: a weak threat. They
cannot do so in combination. In contrast, an individual employer's threat
to withdraw its "labour," i.e., the capital it can make do "work," is a real
threat. This gives property owners a most effective way to offset any
advantage non-property owners may have in democratic electoral
politics by dint of their numbers.
This brings us back to the Harris government's application for an
injunction. It was losing or, at best, not winning, the political struggle.
Given the way in which law favours the rich and disadvantages workers
who try to use collective power, it is hardly surprising the government
reached out to the court for help. We are now in a position to ask the
question: why did the government's legal loss not translate into a
political win for the teachers?
VI. JUDICIAL POLITICS FOR WORKERS,
FOR PROPERTY OWNERS
When MacPherson J. handed down his decision denying the
government the injunction it had sought, teachers hailed it as a moral
victory.60 A moral victory was all that it was. Within a week all the
teachers were back on the job, their terms and conditions to be ruled by
Bill 160. Worse: not only had they won no concessions from the
government but, as seen, Bill 160 had been amended so as to effectively
exclude principals and vice-principals from teacher bargaining units.
This amounted to a loss of an important concession wrung from the
government during the negotiations leading up to the strike.
How, in view of its judicial defeat, can the government's real-
world triumph be explained? The answer lies in the fact that despite his
evident sympathy for the teachers' cause, MacPherson J. could not bring
himself to say that the teachers were entitled to use their collective
withdrawal of labour to change the law.
The teachers had taken the position in court that they were not
on strike in the usual sense of that word, one that denotes that the
workers on strike are engaged in an effort to make an employer come to
terms with them. They argued that their conduct was of a grander
nature. While physically their conduct looked like a conventional
economic strike, it actually should be seen as a protest aimed at the
government of Ontario's education policies. These were said to be
inimical to the public interest. The claim, then, was that teachers and
60 See "Ruling a Moral Victory: Teachers" The Toronto Star (4 November 1997) A6.
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their unions (rather than the attorney general) were defenders of the
public interest.61 Their strike, the teachers had said, was a political
struggle, not an economic one. That MacPherson J. was sympathetic to
their presentation can be gauged from the way he wrote. He
distinguished the teachers' conduct from that of other defendants who
had been enjoined from continuing illegal action to attain their political
goals:
The conduct of the teachers does not, in my view, come close to this definition of flout, or
to the conduct of the defendants in Bear Island Foundation or Grabarchuk. The teachers'
decision was not made with disdain. They had never engaged in a province-wide strike
before last week. The record demonstrates that they made their decision in a careful,
concerned and reluctant fashion. Moreover, there is not a hint of mocking or jeering in
their conduct since the strike began. The strike has been remarkably peaceful, especially
in light of the fact that approximately 126,000 teachers are involved. Finally, the teachers
do not believe that they are openly disregarding the law.62
But as we have seen, MacPherson J. did not base his decision in
favour of the teachers on a finding that the teachers should be allowed to
strike illegally. Rather, he ruled the Ontario government failed because
its case had not been made out. The public's interest was not sufficiently
endangered and the government could show no irreparable property or
contract loss of its own. What underlay his eventual failure to endorse
the teachers' characterization of the strike as validating their conduct
was MacPherson J.'s instinctive understanding that, in a liberal capitalist
democracy such as Canada, it is law's role to privilege the credo of
individualism over the rights of collectives, even when a collective-as he
thought in this case --behaves meritoriously.
Just as a single employee may withdraw his or her labour power
from a particular employer (after giving the agreed upon contractual
notice) or refuse to sell her labour power to any employer in the first
place,63 so an individual wealth owner is free to refuse to enter into
61 This argument had some judicial respectability. It had been supported by Sopinka and Cory
JJ. in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, where they suggested that other
groups, as well as the attorney general, could raise issues of public interest in court. In that case, of
course, the private citizens claiming to be raising a public interest issue were tobacco peddlers who
purported to be defending the free speech rights of all Canadians. This reinforces the argument of
this commentary to the effect that judicial politics have an internal logic that is totally divorced from
reality.
62 Ontario Teachers' Federation, supra note 2 at 376, MacPherson J.
63 This is conventional wisdom. It is understood as a given that there is to be no enforcement
of contracts of service in a liberal polity because that would amount to slavery. The validity of this
claim is contestable. Canada makes it hard for anyone able to sell his or her labour power to get
employment insurance benefits or welfare payments if he or she does not. In order to qualify he or
she must show willingness, if able, to sell to someone. Given that it is the lack of capacity to
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contracts of employment for productive purposes or to withdraw such
funds as already have been invested (provided the contractually agreed-
upon notice provisions are satisfied). This is quintessential liberal law:
individuals, regardless of wealth, are given equal rights and obligations.
It is easy to show the way in which this enables liberal law to perpetuate
inequalities.
During the life of a collective agreement the workers may not
conduct a strike; they may not withdraw their labour in concert to
resolve a dispute, nor may the employer lock out the employees, i.e.,
withdraw its capital to resolve a dispute. But just as every worker may, as
an individual, withdraw his or her labour, every individual employer may
withdraw its capital, provided it does not do so in order to force the
workers to accept different conditions of employment than those
provided for in the existing collective agreement. 64 This "even-
handedness," typical of liberal law's treatment of equality, helps turn the
prerogative of management's teeth65 into fangs.
Further, in a private ordering economy in which governments
rely on the private sector to generate overall economic welfare, the
threat of non-investment by capitalists must be taken seriously by any
government. Bluntly, the economic acts of individual employers have
tangible political consequences. The threat of any individual worker not
to work creates no apprehension in government circles. Law's tight
control over the use of workers' collective economic power, therefore,
makes it easier for the political sphere to be dominated by wealthy
individuals whose sphere of economic political action is virtually
maintain oneself that, in the first place, turns a person into a worker-for-wages, the notion that we
are giving people a true choice as to whether or not to sell their labour power to some employer is a
threadbare one, even if it occasionally looks as if choices are being made. Currently, as the private
economy is proving itself less and less able to provide jobs, people have been forced into becoming
entrepreneurs, that is, self-employed. In 1993 there were nearly two million self-employed persons,
comprising over 15 per cent of the total workforce. By 1996, that number had increased to over two
million people: see Small Business in Canada, supra note 28. In R. Spence, "Entrepreneurial
Nation" Profit: The Magazine for Canadian Entrepreneurs (September 1995) 22 at 24, the author
writes that "corporate downsizing and government belt-tightening have had the effect of pushing
thousands of Canadians into entrepreneurship." This hardly proves that non-wealth owners have a
real choice as to whether to work or not. Many of these entrepreneurs are dependent on one or two
persons with whom they contract. This makes them as vulnerable, often more vulnerable, than
workers-for-wages in the standard job sphere. While this is not the place to expand on this, note that
this is why we have dependent contractor provisions in collective labour relations statutes, and why
we have an increasing number of cases in which small business owners seek to take advantage of the
minimum conditions provided by the employment standards acts of the nation that set out to
protect the most vulnerable of workers.
64 See U.E., Local 504 v. Westinghouse Canada Ltd., [1980] O.L.R.B. Rep. 577; and S.E.L U.,
Local 204 v. Doral Construction Ltd., [1980] O.L.R.B. Rep. 310.
65 See notes 55-57, supra, and accompanying text.
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unbounded.
The only way in which workers can come close to the exercise of
political power that individual capitalists are able to wield is by
combining their efforts.66 But such is the ideological and concrete
material impact of the law that actions by workers using their collective
economic power to attain political goals will rarely be undertaken as
such. Instead, workers tend to play on the fact that law is not just
capitalist law; it is also meant to be liberal democratic law. As a
consequence, when they act politically, workers and their allies seek to
justify their collective economic efforts (which amount to illegal strikes)
by declaring to the world that they are not using their collective power
for economic purposes, but for civil libertarian ones. 67 From the
perspective of this commentary, note that unions, workers, and their
allies, when taking this stand, are buying into the private-economic
versus public-political dichotomy that liberal law maintains to the
advantage of wealth owners.
These efforts to justify collective workers' actions by clothing
them in liberalism's vestments rarely succeed. 68 While a liberal polity
must tolerate mass demonstrations, it does not have to do so when these
demonstrations also amount to interferences with existing private
66 The property-favouring nature of liberal law is even more pronounced than the account in
the text asserts it to be. In employer-employee relations, the employer, more often than not, is a
corporation. It is not an individual in human terms, i.e., in pristine liberal terms. Nor is it
functionally an individual. The corporation, by functional definition, is a collective of people and
things, the very opposite of the atomistic individual who is posited to be, both by liberal political and
market economic ideologies, the fulcrum of the system. To treat the withdrawal of its capital as the
act of an individual, for legal purposes, is to bias the law even more in favour of property owners
than the text claims it to be.
67 This is the way in which the trade union movement sought to characterize its national one-
day strike aimed at the Trudeau anti-inflation legislation. The workers did not call their walkout a
general strike, which is what it was. They named it a "National Day of Protest." This did not fool
anyone, and some employers went to labour relations boards and grievance arbitrators, contending
that, as extant collective agreements were breached, the strike was illegal. They met with success:
see Domglas Ltd. v. U.C.G. W. (1976), 76 C.L.L.C. 16,050 (O.L.R.B.); and Robb Engineering v.
U.S.WA., Local 4122 (1978), 25 N.S.R. (2d) 298 (S.C.A.D.). In British Columbia, the Labour
Relations Board, chaired by Paul Weiler, a person sensitive to the need to legitimate the regime,
sidestepped the problem by ruling that the concerted withdrawal of labour for political purposes
was not an economic strike and, therefore, not a strike regulated by the collective bargaining
statute: see British Columbia Hydro & Power Authority v. LB.E.W., Locals 213 & 258, [1976] 2 Can.
L.R.B.R. 410 (B.C.). This "progressive" approach does not create a safe legal haven for workers
striking for political reasons: the common law courts will fill any space left by the legislative scheme,
and they are hostile to all collective workers' actions.
68 In addition to the cases cited in note 67, supra, the recent Days of Action in Ontario, aimed
at the same government that had attacked the teachers, produced similar results: see General Motors
of Canada Ltd. v. C.A. W.-Canada, [1996] O.L.R.B. Rep. 409.
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property and contract rights. This makes political strikes vulnerable.
While this seems to limit the freedom that should be available in a
liberal political society, this restriction can be justified in liberal terms.
Where the rights interfered with are those of employers functioning in
the private-economic sphere, the workers' demands for public-political
change-which is what is civil libertarian about the mass
demonstration-cannot be responded to adequately by private property
owners. Hence, the enjoining of the workers can be justified on the basis
that private profit-seeking employers cannot be made to bear the burden
of political self-assertion by their workers. But this rationale should have
no validity when the scene shifts to the public-economic sphere. There,
the asserted dichotomy between the economic and the political-which,
a Marxist would argue, is a misleading one-cannot be maintained so
easily. The Ontario teachers' strike is illustrative of this dichotomy.
The teachers' demands were generated by their desire for job
security and the maintenance of good conditions, as are all worker
strikes against their employers. But, to succeed they needed a re-
ordering of government political and spending priorities. The political
and the economic were indivisible. This is why the teachers were
pointing to the unacceptable nature of the government's existing
priorities and to the undemocratic way in which the elected majoritarian
government had behaved thus far. Not only were they seeking to defend
their material interests but, in so doing, they were questioning the
legitimacy of the acts of a legally elected government with plenary
powers.
This is always at the centre of disputes between governments and
their employees. Governments are aware that, in their special setting,
employees with legalized collective bargaining power have been given
the potential to exert an unusual amount of political influence,
something akin to what large employers have in the private sector. It is
not surprising, therefore, that a number of strategies have been adopted
by governments to make sure that public sector workers do not get
political power through the use of private sector collective bargaining-
type rights. Public sector workers' collective bargaining and strike rights,
therefore, are severely curtailed in Canada.
Public sector employees did not get anything akin to the
collective bargaining rights that private sector employees had won at the
close of World War II until the late 1960s and early 1970s. Some public
sector workers still do not have any collective bargaining rights at all,69
69 Ontario's public servants only obtained this right in 1993: see Crown Employees Collective
BargainingAct, 1993, S.O. 1993, c. 38.
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and many of those public sector workers who have been granted
bargaining rights of some kind have very limited ones. For instance,
health care workers are allowed to unionize but do not have the legal
right to strike70 and federal public servants may bargain only about a
limited number of work conditions.7' In addition, the natural confluence
of the political and the economic arising out of public sector labour
disputes explains why, when public sector workers do have full blown
rights to strike and try to use them, governments routinely take them
away.72 Given the ideology, propagated by liberal law, that holds that
collective economic pressure by workers is legally and morally wrong and
is only to be used for narrow, selfish purposes within limited time
periods, it is usually easy for governments, notionally elected to
represent everyone's interests, to get popular support for any such anti-
strike measures. Their employees are easily characterized as selfish, as
engaged in quests for narrow economic gains at the expense of the well-
being of the wider community represented by the government.
The teachers who opposed Bill 160 were not only faced by the
fact that their co-ordinated collective action would fall foul of the
collective bargaining law that regulated them, but also that it would run
counter to the accepted wisdom that endorses the limitation of collective
action by public sector workers. It is easy to understand, then, why
teachers and their unions sought to defend themselves in court on the
basis that they were acting on behalf of the whole of the community and
that their otherwise unacceptable lawlessness was justified. It is equally
easy to see why MacPherson J. groped for a way not to endorse that
position. His intuitive understanding that law's role is to draw a sharp
line between the economic and the political spheres is reflective of the
way in which law is meant to work. His view, like that of other judges,
was informed by the unarticulated assumption that, in a mature liberal
democracy, the political sphere in which the "one person-one vote"
principle reigns, is to be restricted so as to not overwhelm the economic
sphere where the reign of "one dollar-one vote" is crucial to the
dominance of wealth owners. The strength of this rarely articulated
premise is brought out nicely by the episode of judicial politics generated
70 See, for example, Hospital Labour Dispute Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.14.
71 See Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-35. For a historical sketch of the
developments of public sector bargaining rights in Canada and in Quebec, as well as an evaluation,
see Drache & Glasbeek, supra note 19.
72 Favoured governmental techniques include legislative freezes on conditions of employment,
back-to-work legislation or the designation of workers as essential workers who will be required to
work, regardless of their union's legalized use of the strike: see Panitch & Swartz, supra note 19.
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by the Bill 160 dispute.
Before this challenge is analyzed, we might note that the
teachers had organized and militated in an unprecedented way. The
elementary, secondary, public and Catholic teachers, women teachers,
and Franco-Ontarian teachers had formed an apparently united front.
Whatever their past sectoral differences had been, for the moment they
were politically committed to the repeal of Bill 160. They also saw that it
would be very helpful to their struggle to help all Ontario workers in
their fight to halt the Progressive Conservative attack on their rights. It is
fair to say that the Days of Action protests mounted by the social
movements and organized labour against the government would not
have had the huge turnouts they did (e.g., 15,000 in London, 100,000 in
Hamilton, and between 200,000 and 400,000 in Toronto) had it not been
for the teachers' enthusiastic participation. This cannot help but have
had an impact on the teachers themselves. As a result of their opposition
to Bill 160, many must have been more aware than before that some of
their interests and concerns were more congruent with those people they
had seen as "workers" rather than as "professionals." This meant, as
well, that teachers organized in different sectors of the educational
system may have grasped the commonality of their interests as never
before. At the least their actions implied that they were forging alliances
because they had a common enemy.
All this held true until the return to work and the subsequent
constitutional challenge to Bill 160. At that point, to make their legal
case, teachers drew back from their mass, co-ordinated resistance to
what, up until then, they so loudly had claimed to have been the
undemocratic nature of the government's conduct. They had argued that
they were entitled to use extra-legal strategies to defend democratic
principles. In essence, they had contended that the principles of the "one
person-one vote" sphere were justifiably defended by their
extraordinary conduct. Now, as they re-entered the judicial arena to
attack the constitutional validity of Bill 160, they made very different
arguments.
The nub of their constitutional challenge was that, while
government always had provided much of the funding by appropriating
money from its general revenues, Bill 160 removed the power of elected
school boards to raise funds directly from property owners (the boards'
electors). The teachers argued that section 93 of the Constitution Act,
186773 preserves the right of Catholic Ontarians to provide for separate
73 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 11, No. 5 [hereinafter Constitution
Act, 1867].
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education for their children.74 The inability of school boards to levy
funds might undermine the autonomy necessary to the effective exercise
of this right. In short, the argument was that a special right to pursue a
specifically protected religious path is endangered by Bill 160. Property
owners no longer have as much leverage over their local school region's
educational policies. Hence, if there are special needs, or a particular
area has greater expenses than others, the fear is that the power to
correct these local problems by locally funded responses will no longer
exist. This fear is fostered by the fact that Bill 160 empowers the minister
of education to supervise or suspend the operation of a school board if it
runs into certain defined difficulties. In effect, the argument is that Bill
160's formula undermines democratic practices.
Catholic teachers were successful at trial, but lost at the Ontario
Court of Appeal.z5 An appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has been
lodged. 76 This commentary is not the place to debate the merits of these
claims and the dispositions of the courts. It would be premature to do so,
in any case, as the case is on appeal. More germane to this commentary,
however, is the nature of the claims.
If successful on appeal, this challenge will yield one concrete
result the teachers have been seeking: the abrogation of Bill 160. But
success (if it comes) will have come at a cost, one imposed by the
judicialization of politics. If Bill 160 is repealed, it is likely that this will
be so because teachers have been able to characterize their claims as
being those of non-workers. The essence of their claims is the need to
protect religious freedom, namely the agency of some property owners.
Inherent to this claim is the principle that private property owners have
fundamental democratic rights based on their ownership. It is precisely
because these constitutional challenges to Bill 160 are not based on the
use of workers' collective power to attain democratic ends that teachers
have some chance of legal success. In short, the law may permit workers
to achieve political change if they can characterize themselves as the
protectors of property owners' rights. While the end result may satisfy
74 The drafters' understanding was that governments, likely to reflect the Protestant majority's
point of view, might be insensitive to Catholics' desire to have their children's family-fostered
convictions reinforced by the school curriculum.
7 5 Ontario English Catholic Teachers'Assn. v. Ontario (A.G.) (1998), 162 D.L.R. (4th) 257
(Ont. Gen. Div.), Cumming J., rev'd (1999), 44 O.R. (3d) 7 (C.A.) [hereinafter OwcTA]. Five
members of the Court of Appeal sat on the appeal (rather than the usual three), reflecting the
judiciary's awareness of the political significance of the case.
76 [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 314, online: QL (SCCA). See also L. Brown "Supreme Court to Decide
School Funding Issue" The Toronto Star (15 October 1999) A4.
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the teachers, 77 there is no question that it will come at a political cost.
To make their claims in court, the teachers have had to abandon
their common front. Catholic teachers are making a claim separate
from-indeed, opposed to-that of public school teachers. At trial,
Catholic teachers "won." Justice Cumming upheld the claim that their
employers, Catholic school boards, could not be deprived of their right
to levy funds. That is, those teachers won the right not to have Bill 160
apply to them because they were able to establish to the satisfaction of
the trial court that their interests were fundamentally different to those
of the public school teachers with whom, a few moments before, they
had made common political cause in the real world. 78 Moreover,
Catholic school teachers abandoned their allies by taking a stand that
made no real political sense. The Catholic school boards knew that it
was not realistic for them to levy sufficient funds for their special needs
from property owners in their various franchises. After all, non-Catholics
in those areas (often a majority) might very well refuse to pay such
levies, leaving the school boards well short of their targets. Precisely
because, when proposing Bill 160, the government had agreed to a new,
more generous, funding formula for Catholic school boards, their
trustees had sided with the government in the defence of Bill 160 from
constitutional challenge. In short, the Catholic teachers won by making
an argument that made sense in terms of the internal logic of the law,
but not in terms of the concrete circumstances in which the fight was
being waged. Ironically, if they win, their school boards will not be in any
position to give them what they might ask for in collective bargaining in
a post-Bill 160 circumstance, unless the Bill 160 formula is retained.
On the other side, the public school teachers and their boards
lost their argument at trial, and they appealed, arguing that if Catholics
could control financial and religious goals, public teachers and boards
77 In my view even this is highly unlikely. The total invalidation of Bill 160 would unravel the
complex new taxation system the government has established, based on restructured governmental
and municipal roles and functions. Whatever courts may think of the Harris government's policies,
it would be radical for them, as a result of a decision in a case pulling at one strand of a complex
web of legislative fiscal policies, to unravel a democratically elected government's plans. This feeds
my anxiety about the constitutional challenge: I do not think that, in the end, it will be won, and a
great deal of useful political capital will have been destroyed.
78 On appeal, this finding was reversed, the court of appeal holding that section 93 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 73, could be respected without giving boards the right to levy
funds. All that was needed was a safeguard of separate schooling, not a particular means of
protection. In OECTA, supra note 75 at 20, the Ontario Court of Appeal wrote that the taxing power
is not essential, but that "the fundamental necessity in financing denominational education is having
the financial and physical resources to operate the separate school system." This will be the major
bone of contention when the case reaches the Supreme Court of Canada.
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should have the same right. That is, they argued that non-Catholic
property owners should be extended the same right to be levied by
elected school boards and, thereby, to give them some control over local
education. As the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the right of Catholic
school boards to levy funds if denominational schools were otherwise
protected, the public school teachers' and boards' argument became
moot. But, in the meantime, their stand has led to more splintering.
Vulnerable non-Catholic groups have been forced to oppose their
erstwhile political allies. The Association des 6coles publiques de
l'Ontario-trustees of Ontario's French-language district school
boards-was forced to side with the government on -appeal because, like
Catholic boards, the right to tax was a luxury they could not afford.
In short, to win in court, the teachers have had to renounce their
hard-won common front. Emphasis had to be placed, by then, on their
differences. It is true that similar fragmentations existed before the
passage of Bill 160, but they were not exploited as calculatedly as the
Harris-led government has done, and continues to do.79 The
constitutional challenge to Bill 160 has pitted the fragments of teachers'
organizations against each other. Before Bill 160, the teachers had been
discretely organized and had bargained separately. The fragmented
structure had prevented them from combining to help each other. But
they had not actively opposed each other as the logic of the school
funding fight in court is causing them to do.
The teachers' unions might argue that they do not really mean to
harm each other, that they are still comrades-in-arms, and that they are
only pretending to have distinct interests in court to enable them to
attain their common goal, namely to have Bill 160 declared invalid. This
is a dangerous path to tread. Will it really be possible for union leaders
to convince their members, after the judicial proceedings, no matter how
they turn out, that they should pick up the threads of the common front
forged during the province-wide strike? And how will the general public
perceive the teachers? What political education lessons will it glean from
the teachers' posturing in court? Will the teachers' formal and
apparently earnest advocacy of the importance of differences strengthen
or cloud a vision of the common interest of working class people?
79 While the school funding issue remains before the courts, the teachers must negotiate with
school boards charged with the implementation of Bill 160. Teachers, faced with cuts and
increasingly harsh work conditions, have been striking and some have been locked out. From the
perspective of this commentary, the most obvious fact is that teachers are fighting these battles one
school board at a time, as would have been the case before Bill 160. Although the fragmentation,
per se, is not the result of Bill 160, before it was passed teachers were never faced with such a fierce
barrage of roll-backs.
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Present events suggest there is cause for pessimism. The point here is
not a romantic or sentimental one; it is not the case that the teachers'
militance was the beginning of a political revolution. Rather, it is that
the Ontario school teachers' struggle held promise for the advancement
of the cause of real democracy, and that the change of political
terrain-from the electoral sphere to the picket line to the
court-changed the nature of the struggle that the teachers had begun.
